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ABSTRACT
With the excellent accuracy and feasibility, the Neural Networks
(NNs) have been widely applied into the novel intelligent applica-
tions and systems. However, with the appearance of the Adversarial
Attack, the NN based system performance becomes extremely vul-
nerable: the image classification results can be arbitrarily misled
by the adversarial examples, which are crafted images with human
unperceivable pixel-level perturbation. As this raised a significant
system security issue, we implemented a series of investigations
on the adversarial attack in this work: We first identify an image’s
pixel vulnerability to the adversarial attack based on the adversarial
saliency analysis. By comparing the analyzed saliency map and the
adversarial perturbation distribution, we proposed a new evaluation
scheme to comprehensively assess the adversarial attack precision
and efficiency. Then, with a novel adversarial saliency prediction
method, a fast adversarial example generation framework, namely
“ASP”, is proposed with significant attack efficiency improvement
and dramatic computation cost reduction. Compared to the previ-
ous methods, experiments show that ASP has at most 12× speed-up
for adversarial example generation, 2× lower perturbation rate, and
high attack success rate of 87% on both MNIST and Cifar10. ASP
can be also well utilized to support the data-hungry NN adversarial
training. By reducing the attack success rate as much as 90%, ASP
can quickly and effectively enhance the defense capability of NN
based system to the adversarial attacks.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, the Neural Network (NN) is considered as one of the
most representative machine learning technologies, and has been
widely applied into intelligent applications and embedded systems,
such as augmented reality devices [1], mobile natural language pro-
cessing [2], and autonomous-driving system [3]. However, a con-
siderable security issue has also emerged recently with an NN ded-
icated attack method, namely, the Adversarial Attack [4].
The current adversarial attacks are usually designed to manipu-
late the NN image classification results arbitrarily, which is achieved
by injecting adversarial examples into the NN testing phase [5].
Those adversarial examples are generated by dedicated adversar-
ial attack algorithms, which distort the original images with pixel-
level perturbations that even human vision can’t perceive [6]. Even
imperceptible, these perturbations can effectively fool the state-of-
the-art NN systems. As shown in Fig. 1, although the human can
still recognize the adversarial examples as the correct classes of
the originals, the similar adversarial examples could cause ∼90%
misclassification rate to a well-trained NN system [4]-[7].
The adversarial attacks not only demonstrate the vulnerability
of the NNs with significant security issues in practical systems, but
also reveal the significant cognitive difference between the NNs and
the human vision, which makes the adversarial attack an important
approach for the NN study. Therefore, more and more effort has
Figure 1: Original (Row 1) vs. Adversarial Examples (Row 2)
been made to the adversarial attack research recently [6]-[8]. How-
ever, without deep understanding and comprehensive evaluation,
most of the adversarial attack methods still suffer from inconsis-
tent attack success rate, large perturbation area, and considerable
computation cost [9]-[10].
To gain a better understanding of the adversarial attack, we im-
plemented a series of investigations on the adversarial attack, in
terms of attack evaluation, attack generation, and attack defense.
In this work, we have the following contributions:
•We invented a comprehensive adversarial attack evaluation sche-
me. By identifying an image’s pixel vulnerability distribution to the
adversarial attack with saliency analysis, we can evaluate the pre-
cision of the perturbation distribution generated on the adversarial
example, and therefore the overall adversarial attack efficiency;
•We designed ASP, an innovative fast adversarial example gen-
eration framework. ASP is based on a new adversarial saliency
prediction method with comprehensive adversarial pattern analysis
and extraction. With predicted adversarial pattern, the high-quality
adversarial examples can be quickly generated without consider-
able computation overhead;
•We applied ASP to support the data-hungry adversarial training
process. With massive generated adversarial examples included in
the NN training phase as vaccines, the immunity of NNs to the
adversarial attack can be effectively enhanced;
• We implemented the proposed fast adversarial attack exam-
ple generation framework, as well as the fast adversarial training
framework, and quantitatively evaluated their performance compar-
ing to the previous methods.
Experiments show that, compared to the previous adversarial at-
tack methods, ASP has significant cost reduction with (2∼100)×
computation speed-up on MNIST dataset [11] and (2∼12)× speed-
up on Cifar10 [12]. The generated adversarial examples also demon-
strated optimal quality with (1.5∼2)× lower perturbation rate, and
high attack success rate of 87%∼92%. When the ASP is utilized
in adversarial training, the adversarial attack can be effectively de-
fended with dramatic attack success rate reduction of 45%∼90%.
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Figure 2: Gradients based Adversarial Attack
2. PRELIMINARY
2.1 Gradient-based Adversarial Attacks
An NN could be seen as a large-scale non-linear function, com-
posed with massive volumes of neurons, weights (w) and bias val-
ues (b). For the kth neuron i in layer l, the activation α is:
α = δ(
∑
k
wlkα
l−1
k +b
l
k). (1)
While, the whole NN could be written as a function of f(x):
f(x) =
δ(
∑
k
wlkδ(
∑
k
wl−1k δ(..δ(
∑
k
w1kx
0
k + b
0
k)..) + b
l−1
k ) + b
l
k).
(2)
The training phase of a NN can be seen as a loss function opti-
mization process for f(x), which is to reduce the error differenti-
ated between the predicted labels and the true ones. When the error
is iteratively reduced by modifying the weights with gradient-based
backpropagation [13], the NN classification accuracy correspond-
ingly increases and finally reaches a satisfaction degree.
On the other hand, the adversarial attack is similar to the training
phase but with the opposite object. As shown in Fig. 2, when cer-
tain attack targeted error is injected from the very back-end of the
classification, the false gradients will be propagated eventually into
the image and cause pixel-level perturbation. And during the test-
ing phase of forward-propagation, the distorted image will cause
corresponding classification failure, in other words, adversarial at-
tack success.
To achieve the optimal image perturbation, we suppose f : Rm →
[1...y] is a classifier mapping anm-dimensional input vectorRm to
a discrete label set. For an original image of x ∈ Rm and an attack
targeted false label l ∈ [1...y], the adversarial example generation
can be defined as a perturbation minimization process:
Minimize ||θ||p subject to :
1. f(x+ θ) = l
2. xadv = x+ θ, xadv ∈ [0, 1]m,
(3)
where, x and xadv are the original image and adversarial example
respectively, vector θ is the perturbation vector, p is the regulation
factor (p = 1 for L1-norm, p = 2 for L2-norm, and p = +∞ for
L-∞-norm), and [0, 1] is the image pixel value bound constraint.
([0,1] is normalized from 0 ∼ 255 for MNIST and Cifar10.)
2.2 State-of-the-Art Attacking Methods
Currently, several representative adversarial attack methods are
proposed for adversarial example generation, such as Fast Gradient
Method (FGM) [6], Basic Iterative Method (BIM) [6], DeepFool
method [9], and etc. All these methods can generate effective ad-
versarial examples with human unperceivable pixel-level perturba-
tion as shown in Fig. 3.
Fast Gradients Method: FGM is one of the simplest and fastest
adversarial attack methods. It utilizes a relatively big perturbation
step with a hyper-parameter of  to generate perturbation without
specifically targeted false label:
xadv = x+ sign5xJ(x, ytrue), (4)
where, J() is the NN loss function in terms of cross-entropy usu-
ally. As a non-targeted adversarial attack, such a method only costs
one call to back propagation, offering high attacking speed [6].
Basic Iterative Method: BIM is an improved method composed
of iterative FGM, which runs FGM multiple times with a small
step size α. During iteration pixel values need to be clipped to [0,
1] after each iteration to ensure that they are in an -neighborhood
of the original image [6].
xadvN+1 = Clipx,{xadvN +αsign5XJ(xadvN , ytrue)} (5)
This method is a non-targeted attack but takes more iterations com-
pared to FGM. Both FGM and BIM are optimized for L-∞-norm
because they need to restrict the perturbation step to be smaller than
a certain threshold .
DeepFool: DeepFool is also a non-targeted attack technique op-
timized for the L2-norm. This method supposes that a NN is a lin-
ear functions with a hyperplane separating each class from another.
By this assumption, it analytically derives the optimal perturbation
to push the example to pass the hyperplane. Since NNs are not
actually linear, it repeats this process iteratively until a successful
adversarial example is found.
2.3 Adversarial Training for Defense
For one certain adversarial example, the adversarial attack suc-
ceeds when the NN wrongly recognizes the hidden adversarial pat-
tern to be the main pattern. These circumstances happen because
NNs cannot generalize well on pictures containing both adversarial
and main patterns. Thus, training on both adversarial and original
examples could be seen as one of the data augmentation schemes:
augmentating the training data to improve the generalization of
NNs to the adversarial examples. Previous works show that, when
adding adversarial examples as a “vaccine” subset in the training
data, the NN could be more immune to the adversarial attacks with
significantly lower attack success rate [5]. In this work, we also
applied the adversarial training to enhance the NN immunity to the
adversarial attack, more details will be presented in Section 5.
3. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR
ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
In this section, we will investigate the performance of current
adversarial attacks, and propose a novel comprehensive evaluation
scheme based on the adversarial attack analysis.
3.1 Current Evaluation Metrics
In the current adversarial attack works, the evaluation metrics
Panda(Original) Whippet(FGM) Space Bar(BIM) Ibex(DF)
Figure 3: Adversarial Examples Predction Results
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Table 1: Evaluation with Current Metrics
FGM BIM DeepFool
Attack Success Rate 92.4% 99.0% 98.9%
Perturbation Rate 71.85% 63.78% 65.92%
Perturbation Degree 20.63% 13.64% 3.41%
mainly focus on the error manipulation levels, such as: Attack Suc-
cess Rate (1 - Prediction Accuracy), Perturbation Rate (ratio of the
manipulated pixel number to the image resolution), and Perturba-
tion Degree (ratio of the total manipulated pixel value to the overall
image pixel value summation) [9]-[10]. Table 1 shows how these
metrics evaluate the performance of FGM, BIM and DeepFool at-
tacking the MNIST dataset [11].
However, those metrics can’t fully explain the effectiveness of
those attacking methods. For example, FGM has both the high-
est perturbation rate and perturbation degree, which should lead a
highest attack success rate, since more perturbation means a higher
chance of successful attack. But, in fact, FGM has the lowest suc-
cess rate of 92.4%, compared to BIM of 99.0% and DeepFool of
98.9%. On the other hand, DeepFool has much lower perturba-
tion degree of 3.41% and medium perturbation rate of 65.92%, but
achieves the best success rate of 98.9% as BIM. Moreover, even
BIM and DeepFool have the similar success rate, BIM has 4×more
perturbation degree than DeepFool.
3.2 Adversarial Saliency Efficiency
In this work, we propose a new evaluating scheme – Adversar-
ial Saliency Efficiency (ASE). Rather than only analyzing the attack
result, our ASE examines adversarial attack with precision and effi-
ciency with adversarial saliency analysis [14]. The intuitive of this
scheme is to tell if the adversarial example generation algorithm
can precisely find the most vulnerable or sensitive pixels to cast
perturbation. Here, the sensitivity is defined as how much predic-
tion results error that a unit perturbation in the pixel could cause.
Mathematically, the ASE is derived from the pixel saliency anal-
ysis based on Jacobian-matrix, which describes the pixel vulnera-
bility distribution for classification f(xn) : [y0, y1...ym] [14]:
δy0
δx0
,
δy0
δx1
· · · δy0
δxn
Jf(x)(x0, x1...xn) = [
...
... . . .
δy1
δxn
],
δym
δx0
,
δym
δx1
· · · δym
δxn
(6)
where, δym
δxn
means the pixel’s differential impact for the image to
be classified as label ym. Based on the Jacobian-matrix, Adversar-
ial Saliency Map(ASM) is defined by the following equation:
SaliencyMaps = mask ∗ (δytrue
δxn
) ∗ (
∑ δyfalse
δxn
)
where mask =

1, if
δytrue
δxn
< 0 and
∑ δyfalse
δxn
> 0
0, if
δytrue
δxn
≥ 0 or
∑ δyfalse
δxn
≤ 0
,
(7)
where, a mask scheme is proposed to polarize the robust pixels
and attack robust pixels (with true label’s derivative score ≤ 0 or
the sum of false label’s derivative score ≥ 0). Hence, the ASM can
offer a comprehensive statistic of the vulnerable pixels of an image.
With ASM, ASE is then calculated by the divergence of ASM
distribution and adversarial perturbation distribution generated by
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Figure 4: Adversarial Saliency Efficiency Evaluation
specific adversarial attack method, which is defined as:
ASE =
∑N
i (Sort(SaliencyMap)[i] ∗ Perturbation[i])∑
j |Perturbation[j]|
.
(8)
In Eq. 8, rather than evaluate every individual pixel in the ad-
versarial attack, we choose the N most vulnerable pixels with the
highest derivative score. The N is selected in regards of the reso-
lution of the input image, since an improper value could cause sig-
nificant interpretability issue of ASE. In our experiment, we choose
N=50 for the MNIST dataset and N=100 for the Cifar10 dataset.
The sum of effective perturbations on the N pixels will be further
normalized by
∑
j |Perturbation[j]|, which is the perturbation
summation of all the pixels on the image regardless of their vulner-
ability.
To evaluate the effective of the proposed ASE, we applied it to
three methods as shown in Fig. 4. The ASE of the three methods
are 5.6%, 10.1%, 17.9% respectively. And we can see that the ASE
describes their efficiency very well: For FGM, even its perturba-
tion rate is very high, the ASE is low, which means most of the
perturbation are not useful for attacking purpose. This causes the
classification accuracy higher than other two attacks, which means
lower attack success rate. On the other hand, the low perturbation
rate and high ASE of DeepFool indicate an outstanding pixel attack
precision, which make the attack success rate optimal. For BIM, its
ASE along with its perturbation degree are both relatively high, in-
dicating the best performance with precise and concentrated attack.
With our proposed evaluation scheme, the adversarial attack ef-
ficiency can be comprehensively evaluated and applied to guide the
fast adversarial attack as well as defense.
4. ASP FRAMEWORK DESIGN
Due to the complex pixel vulnerability analysis and backpropa-
gation computation, the current adversarial attack methods all suf-
fer from high computation cost. In this work, we propose our
fast adversarial example generation framework ASP: With previous
ASE analysis, we first propose a new adversarial saliency prediction
method, which can effectively analyze and extract a general adver-
sarial pattern for dedicated attack. With the prediction, the dedi-
cated pixel analysis for each adversarial example generation can be
effectively avoided and significantly improve the attack speed.
4.1 Adversarial Saliency Prediction
From previous analysis, we have known that ASM score could be
used to find the most sensitive or vulnerable pixels to attack. And
most adversarial attack should follow the specific adversarial pat-
tern along with those vulnerable pixels distribution. An example is
shown in Fig. 2, which is an adversarial example attacking MNIST
classificatoin with a target of 3→ 8. The best attack performance
is achieved by perturbing the most vulnerable pixels mainly lying
in the different trace of 3 vs.8. In fact, not only for 3 → 8, for
3
1→0 1→2 1→3 1→4
Trunk→Frog Deer→Ship Dog→Automobile Dog→Frog
Saliency Prediction of MNIST (Row 1) & Cifar10 (Row 2) 
Figure 5: Saliency Prediction Examples
any other certain pair of original class and target class, their main
patterns should be analogous.
Therefore, a general pattern in ASM should be predictable for
one certain pair of classes, which could be utilized for attack anal-
ysis and computation optimization. Suppose we have a N class
dataset. For each pair of lori → ltarget(lori 6= ltarget), we could
predict the ASM pattern of them by producing large numbers of
ASM training dataset, based on which we could use linear regres-
sion algorithm to predict the ASM distribution in the general pattern
of saliency maps of each pair. The detailed algorithm for the adver-
sarial saliency prediction is shown in Algorithm 1.
A sample prediction for MNIST and Cifar10 is shown in Fig. 5.
For MNIST dataset, we could see clear patterns for a series of target
adversarial saliency, which are quite easy to understand: Attack-
ing these pixels will alter the original handwriting shape towards
the target class’s shape. For Cifar10 dataset, since the images have
three channels (RGB), the pattern is not that straight-forward to un-
derstand but these patterns all perform well in the following attack
phase, which will be discussed in Section 6.
4.2 Fast Adversarial Example Generation
With predicted adversarial pattern, attackers can directly utilize
it to replace the time-consuming gradients computation for indi-
vidual adversarial example generation. Specifically, we first distort
the most sensitive pixels value according to the order of our ASP
pattern score and a certain perturbation rate. Most examples will
succeed in causing misclassfication results after this step. Fig. 6
shows such one adversarial image generation example in MNIST.
From it we could see that the predicted pattern is still quite ac-
curate and matches the intuitive adversarial pattern. In addition,
for unsuccessful attacked images, we will further adaptively distort
more pixels. The overall algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
To meet the highest performance of adversarial attack effective-
ness, we further optimize the adversarial example generation pro-
cess. We know that a higher perturbation rate not only increases
the attack success rate but also makes the adversarial feature per-
ceivable. So, to analysis the trade-off between the perturbation rate
and attacking success rate, we made a series of tests and eventu-
ally choose 21.7% as the perturbation rate, resulting in 1.4% of test
accuracy (or 98.6% of attacking success rate) with only a few un-
successful examples.
For those ineffective examples, we further adaptively increase
their perturbation rate and modifying pixels according to ASM scores
by a step of 10 in prediction test iteration. Once the prediction re-
sults change to false, we stop the process. Since number of these
examples is minimum, the adaptive perturbation process would not
Algorithm 1 ASP Framework
1: procedure Prediction Training (SaliencyPattern)
2: i = 0, label(X) = x;
3: for X ∈ TrainingSet S do
4: for y ∈ TrainingLabel L and y 6= x do
5: Maps[x][y][i]← ASM(F (X), y);
6: i++;
7: for (x, y) ∈ L× L do
8: if y! = x then
9: SaliencyPattern[x][y]← LR(Maps[x][y]);
return SaliencyPattern
10: procedure Generating Adversarial Examples
11: for X ∈ TestSet S′ do
12: for y ∈ TestLabel L′ and y 6= x do
13: List = Sort(SaliencyPattern[x][y])
14: for i ∈ List[0 :M ] do . Perturbating List
15: Xadv[i] = Clip(0,1)(X[i] + );
16: while f(xadv) = x and List[M ]! = NULL do
17: for i ∈ List[M :M + 10] do . If Attack Failed
18: Xadv[i] = Clip(0,1)(Xadv[i] + );
return xadv
take considerable time or influence the average perturbation rate to
a large extent. Thus, we could make sure that our attacking method
could achieve as high attacking successful rate and maintain low
perturbation rate as possible.
4.3 ASP Framework Overview
In this section, we combine the previously proposed algorithms
and methods to form an effective fast adversarial example genera-
tion framework, namly ASP:
During the prediction training: we first use chain forward deriva-
tive to calculate the Jacobian-matrix for each x with different false
label y in training set. Then we build the saliency maps based on
the Jacobian-matrix. With the saliency maps training data, we use
high performance server to predict the map pattern for each pair
x→ y. We call the above steps the training session.
During the adversarial attack: with the perturbation distribution
on the predicted general pattern, we could directly apply pertur-
bation on the image under attack. This will cost much less re-
sources than other algorithms because of no gradients calculation.
By choosing the best-fit parameters to trade-off the adversarial ef-
fectiveness and perturbation rate, the number of ineffective adver-
sarial examples could be minimized. And additional perturbation
degree will be continuously generated to the ineffective examples
until successful attack. The overview of the proposed fast adver-
sarial example generation framework is shown in Algorithm 1.
5. ASP BASED ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
As aforementioned, the adversarial training can effectively en-
hance the NN defense capability. In this section, we propose an
ASP fast adversarial training framework with the proposed ASP.
Original Image
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Saliency Pattern
Class3→8
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Difference
Adv. Example
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Figure 6: Process of Fast Adversarial Example Generation
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Figure 7: Adversarial Training Process
5.1 Mechanism of Adversarial Training
The adversarial training can be seen as a network regulation pro-
cess with data augmentation scheme, which augments the training
data with adversarial examples to improve the NN generalization
capability for better tolerance with the adversarial examples:
The loss functions of a normal training and an adversarial train-
ing can be formulated as:
Loss = J(σ, x, y);Lossadv = J(σ, x+4x, y), (9)
where, σ in the parameter set of the NN, 4x is the perturbation
value from the adversarial attack, and therefore x+4x represents
the adversarial example. By integrating these two loss functions,
the adversarial training procedure could be formulated as minimiz-
ing the following function:
Jadv(σ
′, x, y) = α×J(σ′, x, y)+(1−α)×J(σ′, x+4x, y), (10)
where, α is the parameter set to adjust the weight ratio between
original dataset and adversarial examples, for which we choose
α = 0.5, considering that both original dataset and adversarial ex-
amples are equally important.
This adversarial training process will eventually minimize the
prediction error as well as the adversarial attack success rate. How-
ever, from Eq. 10, we can also tell that, the adversarial training
is also a data-hungry process for the adversarial examples. Con-
sidering the low adversarial example generation speed with cur-
rent adversarial attack methods, the adversarial training efficiency
is highly compromised. (The computation time for the adversarial
attacks will be quantitatively investigated in Section 6.)
5.2 Fast Adversarial Training Framework
The proposed high performance ASP provides an optimal solu-
tion to the data-hungry adversarial training process. As shown in
Fig. 7, we combine the fast adversarial example generation with
adversarial training to improve the defense capability of the NN.
Suppose we have an N class dataset. We first utilize our fast
adversarial example generation method ASP to attack on the train-
ing dataset samples. Specifically, ASP method will produce N −
1 adversarial examples for each training sample. With our ASP
method, large amounts of adversarial examples could be produced
efficiently. Combining these adversarial examples with original la-
bel, we could get an adversarial training dataset with N times size
of the original dataset (N class for original and N(N-1) class for ad-
versarial examples). Then adversarial loss function is used to train
the neural network. When the adversarial training phase is done,
the neural network will become more robust to adversarial attack,
which will be discussed in Evaluation part.
6. PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION
6.1 Experiment Setup
We mainly test our algorithms on two most popular dataset for
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Figure 8: Test Accuracy Comparation on MNIST
image classfication – MNIST and Cifar10. For MNIST hand writ-
ing digits classification, we use a four-layer convolution neural net-
work as test object, which contains 3 convolutional layer with ReLu
activation function and 1 fully-connected layer with SoftMax func-
tion as output. This model could achieve 99.2% classification accu-
racy after training 10 epochs. For Cifar10 image classification, we
use a ten-layer convolutional neural network training with dropout
technique as test object, which includes 6 convolutional layers, 3
max pooling layers and 1 fully-connected layer with SoftMax func-
tion as output. This model achieves 85% percents classification
accuracy on test images after training 100 epochs. We evaluate
the performance of different attack methods all based on these two
models within the same test environment: Tensorflow-1.3 [15] with
CUDA support, GTX1080 8G. In addition, for computation time
evaluation, we set the parameters in all algorithms to cause just
above 90% and 85% misclassification rates for MNIST and Cifar10
to ensure they produce the same adversarial effect. The adversar-
ial attacks FGM, BIM and DeepFool are tested by using v2.0.0 of
CleverHans library[16].
6.2 Performance of ASP on MNIST
In this section, we compare our ASP algorithm with current ex-
isted algorithms: FGM, BIM and DeepFool, with evaluation met-
rics of perturbation rate, attack success rate, computing cost and
ASE. First, regarding different perturbation degree, the results are
shown in Fig. 8. As Fig. 8 shows, under the low perturbation de-
gree, ASP algorithm has a better performance than FGM and BIM,
which proves that our ASP is more precise and effective than gra-
dients propagation. DeepFool algorithm achieves the best attack-
ing performance with the lowest perturbation degree 0.05, but this
comes with a much higher computation overhead. Note that Deep-
Fool algorithm is a heuristic searching algorithm, thus the pertur-
bation degree is a fixed value.
From Fig. 9, first, we could clearly see that except for FGM,
all of the BIM, DeepFool and ASP achieve 1% test accuracy, which
means 99% attacking success rate. Suffering from imprecise adver-
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Figure 10: ASP Performance on Cifar10
sarial pattern calculation, FGM’s attacking success rate is lowest
since its test accuracy is highest of all, 7.2%. Another significant
result is that DeepFool needs much more computation time for at-
tacking 1000 MNIST images compared to other algorithms. In fact,
DeepFool uses 44.3s for attacking 1000 MNIST images while our
ASP algorithm only uses 0.44s. By comparison, FGM and BIM use
0.94s and 7.65s respectively. Benefitting from the pre-trained pat-
tern, ASP algorithm has the shortest attacking time and also lowest
computation requirements. In addition, ASP algorithm also has the
lowest perturbation rate (3 times less than all other algorithms) and
highest ASE, which also proves ASP prediction’s effectiveness.
6.3 Performance of ASP on Cifar10
For Cifar10 dataset, we first evaluate our ASP attack success
rate under different perturbation rates, shown in Fig. 10. Here eps
means the perturbation step size for the pixels. As Fig. 10 shows,
with just 20% to 30% perturbation rate and 0.2 perturbation step,
ASP could achieve 85% attack success rate. This indicates that the
predicted saliency pattern in ASP framework is also able to imple-
ment accurate and effective attack on more complex images.
For performance comparation, we use the same perturbation step
size eps = 0.3 for FGM and BIM. But due to the different attack
mechanisms, different perturbation degree is produced. Thus in
order to compare their performance more precisely, we use three
different paramter sets for ASP so that they produce nearly same
perturbation degree with our benchmark algorithms. Specifically,
ASP 1 produces the same perturbation degree (21%) with FGM,
and for ASP 2 and BIM (11%), ASP 3 and DeepFool(3%). Fig. 11
shows the ASP performance compararation results. For all three
sets, ASP achieves same or better attack success rate (all over 83%).
In addition, perturbation rates of all three ASPs are 2× less than
their counter parts, which means ASP attack is generated more pre-
cisely and concentrated. Most importantly, ASP takes only 2.1s to
attack 1000 images, which is 1.5× faster than FGM (3.4s) and 12×
faster than BIM (25.1s) and DeepFool (26.9s).
In summary, ASP significantly outperforms FGM, BIM and Deep-
Fool on both MNIST and Cifar10 with (2∼3)× lower perturbation
rates, 1.5× higher attack efficiency, and most importantly, (12∼100)×
attack speed-up at most.
6.4 Adversarial Training Performance
We utilized FGM, BIM and ASP algorithms and generated large
Table 2: Adversarial Training Performance
Test Accuracy FGM BIM ASP
Normal Test on original DNN 99.0% 99.0% 99.0%
Ad.Test on original DNN 7.38% 0.79% 1.71%
Ad.Test on Ad-trained DNN 96.5% 52.3% 45.94%
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Figure 11: Performance Comparison on Cifar10
amounts of adversarial examples on MNIST dataset for training
purpose. Together with adversarial training object function, we re-
trained our previous model with the augemented training dataset.
Table 2 shows the accuracy of a NN before and after adversarial
training, which indicates adversarial training could effectively en-
hance the defense capability of NN to the adversarial attacks.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work, we proposed a new fast adversarial example gen-
eration framework based on adversarial saliency prediction. Com-
pared with current state-of-art methods, ASP could achieve at most
×12 speed-up for adversarial example generation, ×2 lower per-
turbation rate, and high attack success rate of 87% on both MNIST
and Cifar10. In addition, we also utilized ASP to support the data-
hungry NN adversarial training, which effectively enhance the ro-
bustness of NN to the adversarial attacks by reducing the attack
success rate by 45% ∼ 90%.
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